Comments on: Connecting Scholarship With the Battlefield http://cwmemory.com/2006/05/01/connecting-scholarship-with-the-battlefield/ Where History, Heritage, and Education Intersect Sun, 12 Feb 2012 14:34:22 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.3.1 By: Kevin Levin http://cwmemory.com/2006/05/01/connecting-scholarship-with-the-battlefield/#comment-4464 Kevin Levin Wed, 03 May 2006 16:03:15 +0000 http://cwmemory.com/2006/05/01/connecting-scholarship-with-the-battlefield/#comment-4464 <p>Dave, -- I generally agree with your observations. My concern may indeed be misplace or perhaps I just failed to explain myself clearly enough. From a tactical/strategic perspective there were a number of mistakes made. And indeed the terrain is deceptive. I was trying to make a point in reference to our tendency to tell a good tale (which often includes deeply-entrenched assumptions about key players that go unchallenged) as opposed to an interpretation that may not be as satisfying, but gets closer to the truth. The other issue that I am interested in is the extent to which battlefield tours should include references to events that took place on the landscape following the war. The Crater is a great example as reunions and reenactments solidified a narrow focus on Mahone's Virginia brigade and a view of the battle that minimized the presence of black soldiers.</p> Dave, — I generally agree with your observations. My concern may indeed be misplace or perhaps I just failed to explain myself clearly enough. From a tactical/strategic perspective there were a number of mistakes made. And indeed the terrain is deceptive. I was trying to make a point in reference to our tendency to tell a good tale (which often includes deeply-entrenched assumptions about key players that go unchallenged) as opposed to an interpretation that may not be as satisfying, but gets closer to the truth. The other issue that I am interested in is the extent to which battlefield tours should include references to events that took place on the landscape following the war. The Crater is a great example as reunions and reenactments solidified a narrow focus on Mahone’s Virginia brigade and a view of the battle that minimized the presence of black soldiers.

]]> By: Harry http://cwmemory.com/2006/05/01/connecting-scholarship-with-the-battlefield/#comment-4463 Harry Wed, 03 May 2006 15:25:51 +0000 http://cwmemory.com/2006/05/01/connecting-scholarship-with-the-battlefield/#comment-4463 <p>Didn't Grant concur with Meade's "intrusion"?</p> <p>Harry</p> Didn’t Grant concur with Meade’s “intrusion”?

Harry

]]> By: Dave Kelly http://cwmemory.com/2006/05/01/connecting-scholarship-with-the-battlefield/#comment-4462 Dave Kelly Wed, 03 May 2006 15:17:51 +0000 http://cwmemory.com/2006/05/01/connecting-scholarship-with-the-battlefield/#comment-4462 <p>Don't understand your dilema about interpreting the Crater.</p> <p>From a military perspective battle has operational and tactical components. Command and Control, force allocation and maneuver of higher echelons of forces is Operational. Tactics deals with the arrangement of engaged troops, timing, terrain, coordination of commands and supporting fires etc.</p> <p>Meade's intrusion into Burnsides conops was critical to the battle and he should have been villified by the enquiry for it (But since the board was arranged by Meade to seat his "friends" they ignored his malefactions.) Burnside's response to Meade's rebuttal was to draw straws. (Also a bad plan.)</p> <p>Petersburg's terrain is deceptively complex. Broad plateaus that drop into ugly ravines and blinds. Operationally the Crater appraoches look broad and grand, but tactically the approaches to the salient come thru a wash that turns the attack maneuver into a compressed and dangerously narrow assault.</p> <p>The fact that most of the trenches were removed makes presentation difficult in trying to get the untrained tourist to see the clutter of trenches, abatis and bombproofs that disrupted organized formations and command and control.</p> <p>I think there are a good 8 or 9 salient issues that caused the federal assault to fail. They run the gamut from Senior leadership mistakes, to problems with assault tactics.</p> Don’t understand your dilema about interpreting the Crater.

From a military perspective battle has operational and tactical components. Command and Control, force allocation and maneuver of higher echelons of forces is Operational. Tactics deals with the arrangement of engaged troops, timing, terrain, coordination of commands and supporting fires etc.

Meade’s intrusion into Burnsides conops was critical to the battle and he should have been villified by the enquiry for it (But since the board was arranged by Meade to seat his “friends” they ignored his malefactions.) Burnside’s response to Meade’s rebuttal was to draw straws. (Also a bad plan.)

Petersburg’s terrain is deceptively complex. Broad plateaus that drop into ugly ravines and blinds. Operationally the Crater appraoches look broad and grand, but tactically the approaches to the salient come thru a wash that turns the attack maneuver into a compressed and dangerously narrow assault.

The fact that most of the trenches were removed makes presentation difficult in trying to get the untrained tourist to see the clutter of trenches, abatis and bombproofs that disrupted organized formations and command and control.

I think there are a good 8 or 9 salient issues that caused the federal assault to fail. They run the gamut from Senior leadership mistakes, to problems with assault tactics.

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